The 1996 Amendment to the Basle capital accord to incorporate market risks constitutes a breakthrough in the determination of capital requirements. Rather than dictating these requirements through a uniform supervisory approach, banks are allowed to use their own, internal models for computing the capital required. In order to mitigate moral hazard problems and stimulate banks to use adequate internal models, the models must be subjected to a backtesting procedure. If a model produces too many incorrect predictions, increased capital requirements result. This paper provides an evaluation of the current i n ternal models approach in conjunction with the proposed backtesting procedure. In particular, using a stylized representation of the present supervisory framework, we i n v estigate whether banks are provided with the right incentives to come up with the correct internal model. We nd that under the current regulatory framework banks are prone to under-reporting their true market risk. A much stricter penalty scheme is required in order to align banks' incentives with those of the supervisor. We c heck the sensitivity of our results to changes in the length of the planning horizon, portfolio risk, time preferences, risk attitudes, and the distribution of nancial returns.
Introduction
Capital requirements play a major role in the banking industry, see, e.g., Berger, Herring, and Szeg o (1995) for an overview. Following Estrella (1995) , we can distinguish between market capital requirements and regulatory capital requirements. Market capital requirements serve to reduce agency problems, balance the benets of tax evasion versus increases in nancial distress costs, and reduce transaction costs if new investment capital is needed. Regulatory capital requirements, by contrast, aim at protecting the government (and ultimately the tax payers) against nancial distress costs and guaranteeing the soundness and stability of the nancial system. From this regulatory or supervisory perspective, capital serves as a cushion to absorb part of the eect of adverse economic developments on nancial institutions.
A key statistic in formulating capital requirements is the captial ratio, i.e., the ratio of capital to total assets. A t ypical measure of capital is equity, possibly increased by the level of subordinated debt, see Berger et al. (1995) . Berger et al. show that over the past 150 years U.S. capital ratios have gradually declined from around 40% in 1850 to about 6%{8% from 1940 onwards. Several sharp drops in capital ratios follow major changes in the regulatory framework. For example, the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) in 1933 resulted in a decrease in capital ratios of about 50% over a 1 0 y ear period.
It is well-known that at premium deposit insurance schemes like that of the original FDIC can cause perverse incentives for banks, inducing them to engage in more risky activities, see, e.g., John, John, and Senbet(1991) . Boot and Thakor (1991) show that these eects may be mitigated by certain o-balance sheet activities. The historically low capital ratios since the creation of the FDIC and the growing awareness of banks' misaligned incentives have spurred the introduction of new, risk based capital requirements. The prime breakthrough is the Basle accord of 1988, see the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (1988) . Following this accord and its implementation in 1990, banks are required to hold a capital reserve between 0% and 8% for each transaction, depending on its riskiness, e.g., government (0%) versus corporate (8%) loans. The accord also postulates capital requirements for certain o-balance sheet activities. Avery and Berger (1991) and Berger et al. (1995) argue that capital ratios have generally increased due to the new risk based capital standards. Others comment that the requirement of 8% is ad hoc and insucient to meet capital needs in times of stress, see Bradley, Wambeke, and Whidbee (1991) .
Though the 1988 Basle accord already constitutes an important innovation to bank regulation by linking capital requirements to risk, still the accord has a limited scope. This is mainly due to the fact that the accord focusses on credit risk as the single most important risk factor in the banking sector. Due to the rapid developments in nancial markets over the last decade, however, a second risk factor, namely market risk, has grown in importance considerably. Financial losses due to market movements can be large and occur very rapidly, especially if derivative instruments are involved. Some reknown examples include Orange County, Metallgesellschaft, and Barings. See also Jorion (1995) . To accomodate the increased importance of market risk, supervisory standards had to bere-set. The most important development in this respect is the Amendment to the 1988 Basle accord, see BCBS (1996b) .
The Amendment has several innovative features, see also Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) . First, capital requirements are based on banks' internal risk management models. Second, qualitative risk management standards are put to the fore. In particular the rst of these two features constitutes a major departure from previous supervisory practices. Instead of dictating capital requirements through a uniform supervisory approach, banks are allowed to use their own purpose tailored models and expertise for computing the capital required. This allows for much more exibility on the part of banks. The use of quantitative i n ternal risk management models accompanied by a uniform supervisory standard for reporting the output of these models allows for a direct comparison of portfolio risk accross time and institutions. This is one of the main advantages of the approach laid out in the Amendment, see Gizycki and Hereford (1998) .
An obvious major drawback of the proposed internal models approach is the moral hazard problem induced by it. Supervisors have to make sure that banks use an adequate model as opposed to a model that produces capital requirements that are too low from a regulatory point of view, see also Danielsson, Hartmann, and de Vries (1997) . In order to control this moral hazard problem, a model backtesting procedure has been put in place, see BCBS (1996a) . The backtesting procedure automatically results in increased capital requirements if the internal model produces too many incorrect forecasts of market risk. For details on the backtesting procedure, I refer to BCBS (1996a) and Section 2 below.
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we investigate whether the internal models approach combined with the current framework for model backtesting induce the right incentives for banks to come up with good internal models. In particular, we address the question whether banks are likely to under-report their market risk or not, for example by employing a less conservative internal model. Using a stylized representation of the current regulatory framework, we nd that banks are indeed prone to under-reporting under a variety of conditions. Given this result, the second question we address in this paper concerns the construction of optimal backtesting procedures. In particular, we look for a backtesting framework with corresponding penalty scheme that provides banks with suciently strong incentives to construct adequate risk management models. It turns out that with respect to the present backtesting penalty scheme, BCBS (1996a), a much stricter scheme is called for in order to align banks' incentives with those of the supervisor.
The adequacy of the internal models approach as a useful tool for supervision has been debated earlier in the literature by proponents of the pre-commitment approach, see, e.g., Kupiec and O'Brien (1995a ,b, 1996 . They have been contradicted by, e.g., Gumerlock (1996) , who argues that the internal models approach, when used in conjunction with a backtesting procedure, has several advantages over the pre-commitment approach. Kupiec (1995) , however, argues that given the information regularly available to the supervisory institution, it is dicult to develop good statistical backtesting procedures that enable one to detect fraud models at an early stage. Although the aim of the present paper is not to resolve this controversy completely, our results can be used to assess the adequacy of the present Basle proposals in preventing excess risk-seeking behavior and systematic under-reporting of the true market risk.
The paper is set up as follows. In Section 2, the basic framework is laid out. A stylized representation of the current regulatory framework is presented. Section 3 contains numerical results on the evaluation of the present Basle guidelines. Section 4 describes the design of optimal backtesting procedures from the supervisory point of view. Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are contained in Section 5.
A stylized representation of current regulations
As a starting point, we have to dene the way risk is measured. Following BCBS (1996a,b), market risk is quantied using the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is the maximum loss that can occur during a certain period of time given a certain condence level. In our setting, the VaR corresponds to a specic quantile of the prot/loss distribution of the bank's portfolio. For a textbook treatment o n V aR, see Jorion (1997) . The BCBS (1996b) guidelines specify a 10-days VaR and a 99% condence level, i.e., the maximum loss that can occur with a 99% probability in a 10-days period. The 10-days period is motivated by the fact that in periods of severe market stress, liquidity can evaporate very quikly. In such cases, it may be dicult to timely unwind unprotable parts of the portfolio. The bank's internal risk management model is used to compute the VaR. This VaR has to be reported to the supervisor on a daily basis, see BCBS (1996a), along with realized prot and loss gures. Let V a R ( t ) denote the VaR reported to the supervisor at time t. Then the capital requirement is equal to a multiple f(t) of the average V a R ( t ) o v er the last 60-days. If the computed capital requirement is less than the previous day's VaR, the latter is used instead. 1 In order to keep our model analytically manageable, we h a v e to make several abstractions. First, we focus on a xed portfolio of assets and liabilities. We thus abstain from considering the interaction of supervisory regulations and active asset and liability management of banks. This is a limitation of the present framework and we come back to it in the concluding section of this paper. In any case, holding the portfolio composition xed limits the bank's possibilities of exploiting the loopholes in the regulatory framework. Second, we abstract from the dierence between VaR used for reporting and the VaR used for computing capital requirements. The former applies to a 1-day period, while the latter relates to a 10-days period. The dierence is immaterial for the derivations in the remainder of the paper, where we assume that nancial day-to-day returns are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) . In that case, given the xed portfolio, the 10-days VaR is just a xed multiple of the 1-day VaR. Of course, the assumption of i.i.d. returns is not realistic, as a prominent feature in nancial markets is time dependence, e.g., volatility clustering, see Pagan (1996) . We abstract from this complication, as it would render the model intractable. Time dependence is, however, a crucial component for a practical evaluation of VaR measures, see Christoersen (1998) for some possible methods. See also Christoersen and Diebold (1997) , Christoersen, Diebold, and Schuermann (1998) , and for further critical remarks on the (un)importance of time dependence for VaR calculations.
The scalar ination factor f(t) used for transforming the VaR into a capital requirement is one of the crucial variables in this paper. It allows the supervisor to impose monetary penalties on banks with incorrect internal models by the use of a backtesting procedure. Typically, f(t) = 3, which does not appear too unreasonable from a prudential perspective if one allows for model mis-specication, see Stahl (1997) and Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) . Assessing the correctness of the VaR model is not an easy task. Most tests are hampered by a lack of statistical power, see Kupiec (1995) . See also Lopez (1997 Lopez ( ,1998 for several possible ways to evaluate VaR models, and Engel and Gizycki (1999) for some simulation evidence. In this paper we follow the backtesting methodology of BCBS (1996a). In particular, VaR gures and actual loss gures are reported on a daily basis to the supervisor over a 250 day period. Given a VaR condence level of 99%, we expect an average numberof 2.5 days for which the realized loss exceeds the reported VaR, i.e., a so-called VaR violation. If the number of days is signicantly larger, the internal model becomes suspect as it potentially generates too low VaR numbers and, therefore, too low capital requirements. In that case, the supervisor can decide to increase the scaling factor f(t) or (in the extreme) to forbid the use of the internal model altogether. The Basle proposal for backtesting has a very simple mapping from the numberof VaR violations to the scaling factor, see Table 1 . It distinguishes three zones. In the Green zone, the number of violations over the past 250 days is small, such that the internal model can be deemed adequate for capturing the true market risk. Consequently, no increase in the VaR scaling factor is required from its initial value f(0) = 3. In the Yellow zone, doubt arises as to the integrity and/or validity of the bank's model. This is reected in the gradual increase in the VaR scaling factor. If the number of violations is larger than or equal to 10, i.e., if the reported VaR is a 4% VaR rather than a 1% VaR, the model is judged inadequate. In that case, the scaling factor is raised to 4 and the bank is likely to be obliged to revise its internal risk management model.
For the regulatory evaluation period we select 1 year. This means that the factor f(t) is set once a year and is in place for the complete subsequent year. In practice, the supervisor will beable to react more promptly to excessively high numbers of VaR violations, for example, every quarter. By using a more frequent updating scheme for f(t), however, tractability is lost.
In particular, if the regulatory frequency is higher than 250 days while the backtesting still takes place over a 250 days period, subsequent observations on the numberof VaR violations are correlated. As these observations are put through the non-linear mappingf() in Table 1 , the analytics become extremely complicated. To check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the regulatory frequency, we have performed an experiment in which the factor f(t) w as set (and left in place) every 63 days. To a v oid the correlation mentioned earlier and regain tractability, the numberof violations was also counted for 63 instead of 250 days. The number of violations was multiplied by 4 to make the mapping in Table 1 applicable. Using this quarterly approach instead of the annual approach adopted in the remainder of this paper did not have a substantial impact on the conclusion. Relative to the annual regulatory frequency, using quarterly updates resulted in both lower and higher degrees of under-reporting depending on the particular model parameters, see also further below.
We n o w turn to the behavior of the bank. First note that capital requirements have a direct impact on the bank's prot opportunity set. Therefore, abstracting from its own incentive to hold capital reserves, see Estrella (1995) , the capital reserves required by the supervisor are undesirable for the bank from a pure prot point of view. As a consequence, it has an impetus to report VaR gures that are too low, as this lowers its costs of capital. Low VaR gures, however, result in an increased probability of VaR violations, and, therefore, in potential increases in future costs of capital through increases in f(t). This provides a disincentive for the bank to under-report its true market risk. The bulk of this paper now concerns which of these two eects prevails under various conditions. To simplify matters considerably, we only consider a once-and-for-all choice by the bank of its internal model. This is in line with the simplifying assumption of a xed portfolio composition. Note that in the present framework choosing an internal model is tantamount to selecting a particular VaR level. By allowing this VaR level to be chosen only once, we restrict the bank's exibility in exploiting the weaknesses of the backtesting procedure. So if this simplication causes a bias in our results, the bias is more likely to work against than in favor of nding under-reporting of market risk.
To complete the description of the regulatory framework, we have to formalize what happens when a bank enters the red zone from Table 1 . Let V a R denote the true VaR level of the bank's portfolio. Note that V a R does not depend on time given the xed portfolio composition. We can dene a constant c such that the VaR level chosen for regulatory reporting purposes (V a R r ) equals V a R r = ( 1 c ) V a R :
The constant 100 c can be interpreted as the percentage of under-reporting with respect to the true VaR. We n o w assume that the bank can report V a R r to the supervisor up to the moment when the red zone is entered. After that, the regulator sets c = c for all remaining periods. In the remainder of this paper we use c = 0 , such that the VaR is set to the true VaR once the red zone is entered. The supervisor can try to achieve this by close inspection of the bank's internal model. It may seem somewhat optimistic to assume that the supervisor will always be able to set c = 0 . Describing the risk of a bank's portfolio requires expert insight i n to the operation and interaction of all the bank's nancial instruments. Such expert knowledge may not always beat hand within the supervisory institution, e.g., due to time constraints. Therefore, it may well bethe case that c is either positive or negative. We comment on the sensitivity of our numerical results with respect to the choice of c in Section 3. If V a R ( t ) is the VaR level reported at time t, w e n o w h a v e V a R ( t ) = 
Given our stylized representation of the regulatory framework, we assume the bank minimizes a power function of all present and future expected opportunity costs that are attributable to the market risk capital requirements, i.e., min c T 1
where U(x) = x , with 1. The operator E 0 () denotes the expectations operator given the available information at time 0. Furthermore, r is an opportunity cost rate, is the time preference parameter, and T is the planning horizon. The minimization in (4) is carried out with respect to the level of under-reporting c. The opportunity cost rate r is either a required internal rate of return or a market rate. Note that for = 1 (4) collapses to the minimization of expected opportunity costs. For > 1, larger opportunity costs are weighted more heavily, such that stable costs are preferred to highly variable costs, cf. power utility functions for consumption. By varying we can check whether the risk attitude of the bank itself has an eect on the extent of under-reporting.
The stochastic variables in (4) are f(t), t = 1; : : : ; T 1. Given the postulated VaR evaluation period of 250 trading days combined with the assumption of i.i.d. daily returns, the f(t)'s are independent and follow a binomial distribution with parameters n = 250 and (5) where (t) denotes the bank's prot. See also BCBS (1996a) . Note that the probability of success p changens once the bank enters the red zone, i.e., once V a R ( t ) c hanges from V a R r to V a R . Using (4) and (5), it is easy to see that lowering the reported VaR has two eects. First, there is a direct eect on the objective function (4), because the reserve requirement based on the reported VaR causes opportunity costs to the bank. Second, lowering the reported VaR increases the probability p in (5), such that the expectation of f() is increased. This results in a larger penalty for future VaR gures in the objective function.
Although the present framework allows us to address several important questions related to supervision and the internal models approach advocated by the BCBS, there are also several limitations. First, as mentioned before, we do not consider the interaction between supervisory regulations and active asset and liability management b y banks. Active balance sheet management can be used as an additional instrument b y the bank for reducing the number of future VaR violations if an increase in the VaR scaling factor becomes more likely due to the numberof VaR violations already realized in the course of the year. Second, we have not modeled any credibility issues related to a large number of VaR violations. Credibility issues could play a role in the relationship between the bank and the supervisor or between the bank and its customers. Third, the present framework does not incorporate the guidelines of the BCBS on auxiliary model testing, such as stress testing, see the BCBS (1996b). Stress tests reveal the internal model's behavior under extremely adverse market circumstances and can in certain cases trigger a prompter reaction from the side of the supervisor. Finally, w e have taken a simplistic pure prot point of view for the bank. Of course, apart from a prot motive e v ery bank has a drive to manage its returns as well as its risks. This means that the bank has an impetus on its own to hold capital reserves if its market risk is high. This can be captured by imposing upper bounds on the allowable values of c in (4). Estrella (1995) even argues that the regulatory capital requirement may lie below the market capital requirement, see also Section 1. Strong empirical support for this claim, however, is dicult to obtain. Therefore, it is useful to know whether or not bank's incentives are in line with those of the supervisor under the current regulations if the market capital requirement is not binding. Also note that up to a certain extent we can check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the risk attitude of the bank by varying in (4).
Evaluation of the present guidelines
In this section we conduct some numerical experiments in order to assess the eectiveness of the present BCBS (1996a) proposals for backtesting internal risk management models. For ease of notation, we set r V a R = 1. This does not eect the results on under-reporting.
In the Appendix we prove that the objective (4) 
where 1 , U 0 , and U are dened in (4), (5), and (6) in the Appendix, respectively. In fact, 1 is the probability o f entering the red zone, given that the red zone has not been entered before. Furthermore, U 0 and U denote the expected cost penalty function given that the red zone has not and has been entered before, respectively. In our experiments, we use e = 1 : 1, such that the discount rate is 10%. The sensitivity to the value of is discussed further below. Equation (6) has a clear economic interpretation. The rst term is the disutility of the initial period's opportunity cost. The second term gives the probability w eighted discounted sum of expected losses due to the use of the self chosen level of under-reporting c rather than the regulatory standard c .
The last term is the expected discounted sum of disutilities following from the benchmark regulatory model c , i.e., the true model. Note that this last term does not depend on c, such that the solution to (6) 
Increasing the level of under-reporting has several eects. First, the initial opportunity costs are decreased. Second, the probability o f entering the red zone, i.e., 1 , is increased. Third, the disutility gain U 0 U is aected in three ways: (i) the probability o f V aR violations increases, (ii) the expected penalty factor f(t) increases, and (iii) the opportunity costs given that the red zone is not entered, decrease. The direction of the composite eect is not clear a priori.
Before we can actually compute the optimal value of c, w e h a v e to specify a functional form for the probability measure P[] in (5). We assume that the prot (t) follows a Student t distribution with degrees of freedom. The Student distribution nests the familiar normal distribution for ! 1. By considering Student t distributions instead of the normal, we can study the eect of leptokurtosis on the optimal model choice of the bank. Leptokurtosis is a common phenomenon in nancial markets, see, e.g., Pagan (1996) and Campbell et al. (1997) . Dene and to be the mean and standard deviation of , respectively. Furthermore, let T () be the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the standard Student t distribution with degrees of freedom, and let T 1 () denote the inverse standard c.d.f. Finally, let S R bethe Sharpe-ratio of the prot random variable, i.e., S R= = . Using these denitions and the fact that for a 99% condence level VaR 
It follows directly from (8) that p(0) = 1%, such that the use of the true model leads to the correct coverage level of 99%. Furthermore, (8) reveals that the probability of future VaR violations not only depends on the model chosen, i.e., on c, but also on the degree of fat-tailedness () of prots and on the overall risk of the bank's portfolio through the presence of the Sharperatio S R .Banks with high Sharpe-ratios prot less from choosing safe models (c < 0) in terms of reductions in p(c) than banks with low Sharpe-ratios. This is most easily understood by considering two banks with the same value of , but dierent Sharpe-ratios. In that case, the bank with the higher Sharperatio has a safer portfolio and, thus, a smaller true VaR gure. Increasing the true VaR by the same percentage amount for both banks, therefore, reduces the probability o f V aR violations comparatively more for the bank with the low Sharpe-ratio, because the nominal shift in the VaR for this bank is larger than for the bank with the high Sharpe-ratio. empirical evidence on the relation between the standard approach and the internal models approach, see Gizycki and Hereford (1998) . Furthermore, the bank possibly has its own upper bound for allowable values of c due to risk aversion motives which are not incorporated in the present framework, see the discussion in Section 2 and Estrella (1995) . The magnitude of the optimal c is substantial, indicating that it is optimal for the bank to underreport its true market risk by 25% or more if T = 2 and S R>0 : 5. For longer planning horizons, the mismatch between true and reported VaR is generally smaller, but still substantial. The decrease in the optimal value of c for larger values of the planning horizon T is intuitively clear. If more future opportunity costs are taken into account and if the internal risk model must bechosen once and for all, then a safer risk management model will, ceterus paribus, result in a smaller value of the objective function. The eect is more pronounced if we set c < 0 (not shown). In that case the expected future opportunity costs of the bank increase, because the default model (c ) sets a higher VaR for reporting purposes than the true VaR. Even in this case, however, the optimal values of c remain negative, such that it is still protable for the bank to report under-estimates of its true VaR to the supervisor. Extreme parameter congurations are needed (e.g., T = 1 and c = 2 for = 2, and T = 1 and c = 3 for = 1) to drive the optimal value of c to 0.
Second, and related to the rst characteristic of Figure 1 , the optimal degree of under-reporting c decreases if the discount rate is smaller (not shown). Smaller discount rates imply that future opportunity costs are weighed more heavily in the objective function. Choosing a reporting VaR level below the true market risk, i.e., c > 0, causes an increase in (expected) opportunity costs during future periods. Consequently, the optimal value of V a R r (or c) is decreasing in the discount rate . Note that for extreme discounting ! 1, only the rst period opportunity costs are taken into account, such that the objective function becomes monotonic in c for = 1 . Third note the non-monotonic shape of the objective functions in c. We focus on the linear case = 1. The quadratic case = 2 reveals similar features. For c = 1, the reported VaR in the rst period equals 0. Of course, this is an unreasonable value given the BCBS lower bound on reported market risk levels mentioned above. By looking at c = 1 , h o w ever, it is clear that for signicant under-estimates of the true VaR, the bank is (almost surely) forced in the next period to adopt the true model as an internal risk management model, i.e., to set c(t) = c = 0 for t 1. Consequently, for extreme underestimates of the true VaR, the objective function becomes linear in c with slope coecient f(0) = 3. For extreme over-estimates of the true VaR, the opposite happens. In that case future VaR violations become extremely unlikely, such that the objective function in (7) eectively collapses to (1 c) f(0) + 1 e T 1 1 e e (c c) f(0);
which is again linear in c with a slope coecient greater than 3. In between these two extremes, there is a range of values for c to link the two dierent linear segments. It is in this range that the trade-o between reductions in present opportunity costs versus an increase in expected future opportunity costs becomes really apparent through the non-monotonic behavior of the objective function. Fourth, the Sharpe-ratio has an increasing eect on the optimal value of c in the gures presented. Banks with less risky portfolios in terms of higher Sharpe-ratios choose a higher percentage of under-reporting. As mentioned earlier, a bank with a high Sharpe-ratio prots less in terms of a percentage reduction in expected future opportunity costs when the bank increases its reporting VaR. Therefore, the bank with a large Sharpe-ratio places more emphasis on reducing present instead of future opportunity costs. This results in higher values of c chosen by banks with higher Sharpe-ratios. Fifth, has a decreasing eect on the optimal degree of under-reporting. This is clear, as a higher penalty on increases in opportunity costs induces a shift towards a more truthful reporting of market risk. Another way of looking at this is from a risk aversion perspective. For = 2, the bank prefers stable costs to variable ones. Higher c values lead to a higher probability o f facing future increases in f() and entering the red zone, and thus to unstable opportunity costs. Therefore, lower values of c are preferred for = 2 v ersus = 1 .
W e n o w turn to a discussion of the robustness of our results with respect to the degree of fat-tailedness of the prot distribution. The degree of fattailedness can be tuned by setting the parameter . The larger the value of , the more the prot distribution resembles the familiar normal distribution.
Changing triggers several dierent eects, see (8). First, decreasing shifts the 1% quantile T 1 (0:01) to the left. Second, for lower values of the Sharpe-ratio becomes more important for the eect of c on the probability o f V aR violation p(c). If two banks have the same Sharpe-ratio, the bank with the fatter-tailed prot distribution prots less from a decrease in the degree of under-reporting c. Third, there is an eect of through the c.d.f. T () used to compute p(c) in (8). The total impact of the combination of these three eects is dicult to predict a priori. Therefore, we compute the optimal value of c using the objective function (6) for dierent v alues of the planning horizon T and dierent degrees of leptokurtosis . We focus exclusively on the linear case, = 1 . The results are presented in Figure 2 . Note that we use 3= instead of as a plotting variable for reasons of layout. The normal distribution now corresponds to 3= = 0, while the most fat-tailed (nite variance) distribution considered is 3= = 1 , = 3 .
Note that in order to construct Figure 2 , the Sharpe-ratio is kept xed. In eect, this means that the variance of the prot distribution is kept xed as the degree of fat-tailedness 3= is increased. This leads to a composite eect. First, larger values of 3= lead to fatter tails, such that extreme prots become more likely. Second, if the variance is held xed, larger values of 3= lead to an increased precision ( = ( ( 2))) of the Student t distribution and, thus, to a decrease in the probability of extreme prots. For more details on this, see Lucas and Klaassen (1998) .
The decrease in the optimal value of c as a function of T for xed is evident in Figure 2 . Furthermore, the optimal value of c is increasing in the degree of leptokurtosis 3= for xed T. This means that the eect of through a reduced eect of c on p(c) g o v erns the composite eect mentioned above. Banks with a higher value of 3= obtain relatively less reward from raising their reported VaR above the true level (c < 0) in terms of a decrease in expected future opportunity costs, see (8). Consequently, for short planning horizons, these banks will be more inclined to emphasize reductions in present opportunity costs by choosing a, ceterus paribus, higher value of c.
Figure 2 reveals that this eect may be so strong that the bank will even opt for reporting VaR values more than 70% below the true risk level if the prot distribution is fat-tailed, e.g., 3= = 1. Note again that such gures may not berealized in practice due to banks' market capital requirements, Estrella (1995) , and the BCBS safety check using the standard rather than the internal model, see earlier.
To conclude this section, we summarize the main ndings. If a bank is forced by the supervisory institution to pick an internal risk management model for the entire planning period, and if this model is subjected to backtesting according to the BCBS (1996a) report, banks generally select overly risky models. The eect is more pronounced for shorter planning horizons, higher discount rates , fatter tails for the prot distribution, higher values of the Sharpe-ratio, and linear versus quadratic cost penalties. By contrast, if the default model upon entering the red zone overestimates the true VaR, i.e., if c < 0, relatively more prudent risk management models are chosen.
Extreme parameter congurations are needed to drive the (locally) optimal value of c to 0.
Designing optimal backtesting procedures
So far, we have concentrated on the optimal choice of the bank's reporting VaR given the supervisory regulations as laid out in BCBS (1996a,b). We now turn to a second important question. Given the bank's incentive to under-report the true market risk, what is the optimal backtesting approach for the supervisor? It is clear from the previous section that the monetary penalties as proposed by BCBS (1996a) are insucient to guarantee a close match between reported and true VaR. We expect, therefore, that optimal backtesting procedures will set much higher monetary penalties than the ones presented in Section 2. It is the aim of the present section to quantify such optimal penalty schemes and associated backtesting procedures.
Before we can proceed with the analysis, some choices must be made regarding the objectives of the supervisor and the instruments available for achieving these objectives. Note that the bank's optimal value of c depends on several parameters, namely the planning horizon T, the discount rate , the bank's Sharpe-ratio S R ,the power of the disutility function , and the degree of fat-tailedness of the prot distribution as characterized by the degrees of freedom parameter . We assume that the bank has some prior ideas concerning the values of the above parameters. These ideas, possibly updated by empirical research, are summarized in the form of a (posterior) distribution function q(T ; ; S R ; ). The supervisor now minimizes the ob-jective function E q (c) 2 1 fc0g + ( c= 1 ) 2 1 fc<0g ; (10) where E q () denotes the expectations operator with respect to the posterior distribution q(), and 1 A is the indicator function of the set A. Equation (10) states that the supervisor minimizes an asymmetric quadratic loss function of the percentage mismatch between the true VaR and the reported VaR.
If this minimization has to be carried out for known values of T, , S R , and , the posterior distribution can be chosen to have a unit mass point at the known parameter values. Alternatively, if an adequate backtesting procedure is needed for a broader range of parameter values, a non-degenerate support of the posterior distribution can be chosen. Note that 1 in (10) determines the degree of asymmetry. For 1 = 1 , under-reporting and overreporting are penalized in the same way. By contrast, if 1 > 1, underreporting is penalized relatively more heavily. An asymmetric loss function seems adequate from a supervisory point of view, where under-reporting is of greater concern than over-reporting. Note, however, that the supervisor may also have an incentive not to distort the market too much b y excessively stringent regulations, i.e., by inducing c < 0. This can be taken into account by setting 1 < 1.
In this section we treat and T as given. Moreover, we only consider the linear cost function, = 1. The VaR mismatch is thus averaged with respect to S Rand only. The results are remarkably stable with respect to variations in and T, such that we only report the ndings for e 1 = 10% and T = 10. We assume that the remaining posterior distribution q(S R ; ) is uniform on a grid of values for (S R ; ). We consider = 5; 10; 1 and S R=S R 0 = ( 2), with S R 0 =0 : 5 ;1 : 0 ;1 : 5. The limited number of combinations taken into account is motivated by two reasons. First, the optimization problem using objective function (10) is very computer intensive. A simple choice for the posterior distribution can speed up the calculations considerably. Second, the optimal solution is mainly driven by the corners of the (S R ; )-grid considered, cf. Figure 2 . Therefore, we do not expect to lose much information when discarding many intermediate combinations of Sharpe-ratios and degrees of freedom parameters.
We now turn to the available instruments for minimizing the objective function (10). Given the framework laid out in Sections 2 and 3, we have as possible instruments the length of the backtesting period n, the penalty functionf(i), and the choice of the default model c . We concentrate on the rst two of these. The value of c is zero in all computations presented below. Negative values of c result in a permanent increase in opportunity costs. Using the present value of these opportunity costs, negative values of c can be represented by high temporary penalties, i.e., by high values off(i). Some unreported experiments reveal that the qualitative results of the present section remain unaltered if the annual backtesting procedure (n = 250) is shortened to a bi-annual or a quarterly frequency, see also the comments in Section 2. Therefore, we only present the results for n = 250.
Note, however, that shortening the backtesting period would have adverse eects on the general statistical reliability o f the backtesting procedure, see Kupiec (1995) .
We estimate the functionf(i) non-parametrically. In particular, we set f(0) = 3 andf(250) = , where denotes an upper bound which is imposed to obtain numerical stability. Moreover, we restrictf() t o b e nondecreasing. The minimization problem now goes as follows. For a given penalty functionf() satisfying the restrictions above, the banks set their It is immediately apparent from the left-hand panel in Figure 3 that the optimal form off(i) does not look at all like the penalty function proposed by the BCBS (1996a). The corresponding gures for 1 = 1 ; 2 look extremely similar, except that the values off(5) andf(6) are slightly lower for lower values of 1 for equal to 5 and 10, respectively. Three main dierences can be seen with respect to the Basle function. First, the number of violations for which no additional penalty is imposed is larger for the optimal penalty function if the upper bound is either suciently large or suciently small. Only for = 5 the number of no-penalty v alues of i coincides with the Basle scheme. Second, while the penalty function proposed by the BCBS shows a gradual increase from the base factor 3 to the maximum factor 4, the optimalf(i) is a kind of step function. Up to a certain threshold for VaR violations, no penalties are imposed on the bank. If the numberofVaR violations exceeds this threshold, however, a comparatively constant penalty is imposed. For large enough potential penalties, e.g., = 1 0 ; 15, an intermediate penalty is imposed if either 5 or 6 VaR violations are encountered, respectively. Third, the maximum increase in the scaling factor for the Basle proposals falls far below the optimal maximum penalty. In particular, the optimal maximum penalty appears to coincide with the upper bound used in the computations.
The right-hand panel in Figure 3 gives insight into the maximum percentage mismatch between true and reported VaR. It appears that within the present framework, the Basle guidelines result in severe under-estimates of the true VaR. Maximum penalties should be set substantially higher in order to drive the value of c closer to zero. Note that the use of an asymmetric loss function indeed results in an asymmetric distribution of optimal degrees of under-reporting for suciently large . If 1 > 1, over-reporting occurs relatively more easily. This is brought about by a slight increase in the penalty function at 5 or 6 VaR violations, see also the comments on the left-hand plot in Figure 3 .
The practical implementability of the step-type penalty function exhibited in Figure 3 warrants one cautionary remark. The derivations so far hinge on the assumption that the bank knows its true VaR, while the supervisor does not. Although it is reasonable to presuppose that the bank has a better understanding of its VaR than the supervisor, it is unrealistic to assume that the bank can estimate its VaR without error. If we relax the assumption of complete knowledge of the true VaR by the bank, a more gradual shape of the optimal penalty function might be more appropriate in order to account for the possibility of unintentional VaR mis-specication by the bank. Alternatively, the supervisory institution could retain the step-type penalty function and put the whole burden of accounting for estimation and model mis-specication risk on the bank. This would stimulate the banks somewhat more to design models that produce more prudent VaR numbers, i.e., lower c's.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have evaluated the Basle proposals for the use of internal models in conjunction with backtesting procedures, BCBS (1996a,b) . It turns out that the present proposals for imposing penalties on banks that violate their VaR bounds too often, are highly inadequate. The monetary penalties are too low to provide a suciently strong incentive for banks to design internal risk management models that produce good estimates of their true VaR. Consequently, it is protable for banks to under-report their true market risk. The eect will be mitigated in as far as the market capital requirement lies above the regulatory capital requirement, cf. Estrella (1995) . From a prudential perspective, however, it is goodpractice not to rely too much on the market capital requirement to be binding, especially if no solid gures on it can be obtained from empirical research. In any case, even if the market capital requirement is binding, the present paper shows that the current backtesting framework does not contribute to a proper alignment o f the banks' incentives for VaR reporting with those of the supervisor.
The optimal strategy for the supervisor given the above ndings is to set much higher monetary penalties on an excess numberof VaR violations. Moreover, the penalty function can be made much steeper than in the BCBS (1996a) proposal. The steepness result, however, is based on the bank knowing its own true market risk. This is an unrealistic assumption for all practical purposes. If estimation and model mis-specication risk are taken into account, more gradual penalty functions might turn out to beoptimal. More research has to be directed to this topic.
As to the height of the maximum penalty, several remarks are in order pertaining to the practical implementability of the results. First, requiring a large penalty following a large numberof VaR violations can beadraconic type measure. As an alternative, one could use a smaller penalty, e.g., in the form of a smaller increase in the VaR scaling factor, that is left in place for a longer time. Similar ideas have been developed in the context of the pre-commitment approach, see Kupiec and O'Brien (1997) . Second, the supervisor should always retain the right to abstain from imposing penalties if a bank can convincingly argue that the cause of a large numberof internal model failures lies beyond its responsibility. The burden of proof, however, should remain at the bank, cf. BCBS (1996a). Finally, imposing penalties, in particular high ones, can beinappropriate in situations of severe market uctuations. In particular, a large numb e r o f V aR violations may signal that the bank has gone through a dicult period. Imposing (severe) monetary penalties in addition to the already experienced diculties might then push the bank further into trouble, and in the extreme into default. This com-ment, however, pertains equally to the backtesting as to the pre-commitment approach.
Several interesting questions for future research remain. For example, it is interesting to investigate the eect of active asset and liability management (ALM) from the side of the bank on the optimal supervisory policies. If banks are able through active ALM to limit the numberofVaR violations if a certain numberofVaR violations has already occurred during the supervisory period, then we expect even more severe under-estimates of the true VaR for reporting purposes. Modeling the internal ALM process of the bank, however, is far from trivial, and more research is needed to design an adequate and tractable framework, see for example Fusai and Luciano (1998) . It would also be interesting to add uncertainty to the model in the form of an unknown value for the true VaR. Although this would highly complicate matters within the present framework, it seems more realistic that neither the bank itself nor the supervisor can come up with a faultless estimate of the true VaR.
NOTES:
1 : In the ocial guidelines, there is another capital charge to account for idiosyncratic risk. For simplicity, w e abstract from that here, see also Lopez (1997 Lopez ( ,1998 
i.e., the probability of not entering the red zone given that the original VaR reporting level is still used. We then have Figure 1 The gure contains the objective function (6) for dierent v alues of the Sharpe-ratio (S R ), dierent lengths of the planning horizon (T ), and dierent v alues for the power exponent of the cost disutility function (). 100 c denotes the percentage of under-reporting, i.e., the decrease of the reported VaR (V a R r ) with respect to the true VaR (V a R ). At the local minimum of each curve, a vertical line indicates the c-value corresponding to this local minimum. The discount rate used for constructing the plots is 10%. The bank has to adopt the true model if it enters the red zone of Table 1 , i.e., c = 0 . The plots are made for r V a R = 1 .
Figure 2
The gure contains the (locally) optimal degree of under-reporting, i.e., the percentage decrease of the reported VaR with respect to the true VaR (100c). The objective function used is (6) with = 1 . The Sharpe-ratio used for constructing the gure is S R= 1 : 0. The optimal value of c is graphed as a function of the planning horizon T and the degree of fat-tailedness 3=. Higher values of 3= indicate that the underlying distribution is more fat-tailed. Discounting takes place at a 10% rate, while the default risk management model is the true model, i.e., c = 0 .
Figure 3
The left panel of the gure contains the optimal penalty functionf(i) for the supervisor for various values for the upper bound using the asymmetric loss function with 1 = 4 . F or ease of reference, the penalty function proposed by the BCBS (1996a) is also presented. i denotes the numb e r o f V aR violations during the last n = 250 trading days. The planning period used for the gure is T = 10, while discounting takes place at a rate of 10%. The right panel contains the interval of optimal under-reporting c over the considered grid of values for the Sharpe-ratio S Rand the degrees of freedom parameter . The horizontal axis in the right panel gives the value of the upper bound . For each v alue of , w e give the result for three values of the asymmetry parameter 1 . B again denotes the penalty function according to the BCBS (1996a) report.
